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THE FALL IN MARITAL FERTILITY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY FRANCE
E .A
. Wrigley(*)
Abstract: In the over-all sequence of the population
transition, France stands out as a special case with a
considerably lower growth rate than its European
neighbors . This paper explores the pattern of the fall
in French marital fertility on the national level.
Moreover, it also seeks to explain the causes of the
change from controlling fertility by marriage to
curbing it within marriage.
The study of the onset of family limitation in Europe owes a great deal to
the Princeton fertility project which has collected, analysed and published
a huge mass of data in a standard form during the last two decades, In a
recent article two of the most distinguished participants in this project,
Knodel and van de Walle, have attempted to distil the essence from the
plethora of empirical historical data which it has produced in order to
discuss their policy implications for countries in which fertility has
started to fall recently . They present their conclusions firmly while
agreeing that the evidence does not preclude other interpretations, sugges-
ting inter alia that "increase in the practice of family limitation and the
decline of marital fertility were essentially irreversible processes once
under way."(1) This conclusion is closely related to their view that ig-
norance of an effective method of limiting family size was a main reason for
the absence of an earlier fall in marital fertility . They take, in other
words, a strongly "innovation" rather than an "adjustement" view of the
fertility transition, and argue that developments in the Third World today
are following a similar pattern.
One of the two authors of the article, van de Walle, has done more than any
other living scholar to describe and explain the fertility history of France
in the nineteenth century, and it is therefore interesting that he and
Knodel do not regard France as out of conformity with their view of the
nature of the European fertility decline. They note that the timing of the
start of the fertility decline in France sets it apart from the rest of
Europe and that it occurred when France "could hardly be considered very
advanced . . . in terms of any standard definition of development", but show
no inclination to treat it as an exception to their generalised picture .(2)
In this essay I shall present an alternative interpretation of French popu-
lation history during the nineteenth century . Instead of treating the period
from the earliest decline about 1800 to the ultimate 'bottoming out' in
fertility about 1930 as one variant of the normal European pattern differing
from other countries only in being unusually long drawn out, I shall argue
that it is better regarded as falling into two halves sufficiently dissimi
lar to be treated as distinct, the earlier having much in common with the
" traditional" European systems of population control, the later indis-
tinguishable in character from the changes taking place in most of the rest
of Europe.
(*) Address all communications to : E .A
. Wrigley, London School of Economics,
Houghton Street, Aldwyck, GB-London WC2A 2A2 . This is an abbreviated
version of a longer paper published in the first two issues of the
Journal of European Population Studies (19 8 5) .
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France and her neighbors
As a background to the consideration of French population history in greater
detail, it is convenient to compare French population history with that of
other European countries in order to drive home the remarkable extent and
the immense general importance of the contrasts between France and her
neighbors . Table i shows the population totals of France, England, Sweden
and Germany 1700, 1800 and 1900 . Even in the eighteenth century the rate of
growth in France was somewhat lower than in the other three countries,
though the differences were not large . But during the nineteenth century the
contrast became much more stongly marked for in France the rate of growth
rose only fractionally to 38 percent, whereas in the other three countries
there was a marked acceleration in growth rates to 252, 119 and 172 percent
respectively . In all three countries, moreover, unlike France, there was net
emigration.
Table 1 : Population totals in France, England, Sweden and Germany
1700 1800 1900 1700 - 1800 1800 - 1900
France 21 .50 29 .10 40 .17 35 38
England 5 .06 8 .66 30 .52 71 252
Sweden 1 .37 2 .35 . 5 .14 72 119
Germany c . 14 .50 c . 20 .70 56 .37 43 172
Sources : France 1700 and 1800; J . Dupâquier, La population francaise aux
XVlle et XVllle siècles (Paris, 1 979), p p . 34, 81 . France 1900; B.R.
Mitchell, European historical statistics, 2nd rev . ed . (Cambridge, 1981),
tables Bi, B3.
England 1700 and 1800 ; E .A. Wrigley and R
.S . Schofield, The population
history of England 1541-1871 . A reconstruction (Cambridge, 1981), table 7 .8,
pp. 208-9. England 1900; B.R . Mitchell and P . Deane, Abstract of British
historical statistics (Cambridge, 1962), pp . 6, 22.
Sweden ; E . Hofsten and H . Lundström, Swedish population history . Main trends
from 1750 to 1970, Urval no . 8 (Stockholm, 1976), table
	
p . 13.
Germany 1700 ; K. McEvedy and R . Jones, Atlas of World population history
(London, 1978), pp . 67-72
. Germany 1800 and 1900, Mitchell, European histo-
rical statistics, table B 1.
The extent of the divergence of French population history from that of other
countries can also be pictured in other ways . From the 1740s onwards the
annual totals of births occurring in France are known with only a small
margin of error . Surprisingly enough, the French total scarcely varied
between the 1740s and the 1870s, declining slowly thereafter . Such growth of
population as occurred in France in the later eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, therefore, was due to declining mortality . The base of the popu-
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lation pyramid did not vary in breadth but, with falling death rates, it
supported a greater weight of numbers above it.
The history of French mortality trends has received much less attention than
that of fertility, but might repay greater study since it was also quite
distinctive. The trends for France, England and Sweden are set out in
table 2,
Table 2 : Expectation of life at birth in France, England and Sweden
(sexes combined)
France England Sweden
1740-9 24 .7 35 .3
1750-9 27 .9 37 .3 36 .0
1760-9 27 .7 35 .0 35 .0
1770-9 28 .9 38 .2 33 .3
1780-9 27 .8 35 .9 35 .2
1790-9 31 .3 36 .8 37 .9
1800-9 34 .1 38 .7 35 .8
1810-9 36 .7 37 .9 37 .0
1820-9 38 .8 39 .9 40 .8
1830-9 39 .9 40 .2 41 .0
1840-9 41 .3 39 .6 43 .8
1850-9 38 .9 40 .4 42 .4
1860-9 41 .0 40 .3 44 .6
1870-9 43 .1 42 .8 46 .9
1880-9 43 .3 45 .2 50 .0
1890-9 46 .1 46 .4 52 .3
1900-9 48 .2 50 .1 55 .7
1910-9 51 .5 53 .1 57 .0
1920-9 54 .8 58 .8 62 .0
Sources : France 1740-9 to 1820-9; Y . Blayo, 'La mortalité en France de 1740
à 1829', Population, 30, numéro spécial, Démographie historique (Nov.
1975), tables 15 and 16, p . 141 . France 1830-9 to 1910-9 ; J . Bourgeois-
Pichat, 'The general development of the population of France since the
eighteenth century' in D .V . Glass and D.E.C. Eversley (eds .), Population in
history (London, 1965), table 2, pp
. 5 04-5 .
England 1740-9 to 186o-9 ; Wrigley and Schofield, Population history of
England, table A3 .1, p.529. England 1870-9 to 1910-9 ; R .A .M . Case, C.
Coghill, J
.L . Harley and J .T . Pearson . The Chester Beatty Research Institute
Serial Abridged Life Tables . England and Wales 1841-1960, Part 1 (London,
1962), pp . 45-5 6 and 69-80.
Sweden 1750-9 to 1830-9 ; Hofsten and Lundström, Swedish population history,
figure 3 .8, p. 54. Sweden 1840-9 to 1910-9 ; Historisk statistik för Sverige,
Del 1 . Bevolkning 1720-1967 (Stockholm, 1969), table 42, p . 118.
showing that expectation of life in France did not differ greatly from that
in England from about 1820 onwards but before then there were marked differ-
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ences for in the middle of the eighteenth century when e . in France was by
far the lower of the two . It may indeed be thought ironicthat the improve
nient in mortality in England in the later eighteenth century, which has
often been cited as the chief reason for the rising rate of population
increase, should prove to have been relatively slight, whereas in France the
extent of the improvement was much greater even though the population growth
rate remained so modest.
The explanation of the absence of any acceleration in the French population
growth rate with the fall in mortality lies, of course, in a matching fall
in fertility . In table 3 the changing levels of the gross reproduction rates
Table 3 : Gross reproduction rates in France, England and Sweden
France England Sweden
1740-9 2 .53 2 .27
1750-9 2 .56 2 .32 2 .33
1760-9 2 .48 2 .39 2 .26
1770-9 2 .38 2
.53 2 .15
1780-9 2 .28 2 .62 2 .02
1790-9 2 .19 2 .76 2 .16
1800-9 2 .00 2 .93 2
.04
1810-9 1 .94 3 .06 2 .14
1820-9 1 .91 2 .86 2 .31
1830-9 1 .84 2 .53 2
.22
1840-9 1 .77 2 .35 2
.14
1850-9 1 .70 2 .34 2 .15
1860-9 1 .71 2 .39 2 .15
1870-9 1 .65 2
.31 2 .19
1880-9 1 .56 2 .16 2 .10
1890-9 1 .43 1 .88 1 .99
1900-9 1 .32 1 .60 1 .87
1910-9 1 .20 1 .41 1 .52
1920-9 1 .15 1 .14 1 .14
Sources : France 1740-9 to 1760-9 ; L . Henry and Y . Blayo, 'La population de
la France de 1740 à 186o', Population, 30, numéro spécial, Démographie
historique (Nov . 1975), table 22, p . 109 France 1770-9 to 1920-9; Bourgeois-
Pichat, 'The population of France', table 3, p . 506.
England 1740-9 to 1860-9; Wrigley and Schofield, Population history of
England, table A 3 .1 , p. 5 29 ; England 1870-9 to 1920-9 ; D .V . Glass, 'Changes
to fertility in England and Wales, 1851 to 1931', in L . Hogben (ed .),
Political arithmetic (London, 1938), table 2, p . 168.
Sweden, Historisk statistik, table 34, p . 105.
are set out for the sanie three countries whose mortality history is des-
cribed in table 2 . The GRR fell uninterruptedly in France from the mid-
eighteenth century onwards except for a hesitation about 186o . In England,
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on the other hand, the GRR rose strikingly between the 1740s and the 1810s,
fell away substantially to the 1840s, stagnated for a generation and then
sagged rapidly thereafter . By the 1920s fertility in all three countries had
converged to a common level below that necessary for replacement.
The combined effects of the prevailing levels of fertility and mortality
serve to determine population growth rates . Every combinatin of levels of
fertility and mortality, if sustained sufficiently long to ensure that a
stable age structure supervenes, will result in a particular intrinsic
growth rate, r . Figure i sets out the vicissitudes of r in France, England
and Sweden . It possesses by construction the property that all combinations
of fertility and mortality which give rise to a particular level of r will
lie on a diagonal line running at 45 0 between the two axes of the graph, and
also that the ratio of the vertical to the horizontal distance between any
two points expresses the relative importance of the change in fertility to
the change in mortality in altering the intrinsic growth rate.
Figure 1 : The intrinsic growth rate in France, England and Sweden
Note : For sources used and other details of the data shown, see the notes to
tables 2 and 3 . For a full description of the method of presenting the
data and its limitations, see Wrigley and Schofield, Population
history of England, pp . 236-248 .
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It is easy to appreciate when the data are displayed in this fashion that
the intrinsic growth rate in France was never far from zero between 1740 and
188o, and that changes in fertility and mortality contributed in equal
measure to the changes in r, causing the set of points relating to France to
be strung out along the diagonal representing the zero intrinsic growth
rate . Figure 1 underlines the distinctiveness of French population history
especially until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.
The behavior of a measure of general fertility such as the GRR is not
necessarily a good guide to changes in marital fertility . Changes in the
timing and prevalence of marriage may have a powerful influence on general
fertility even though marital fertility changes little or not at all . For
societies in which marriage is early and virtually universal for women this
point has little relevance since marriage may be largely determined by a
biological event, the onset of menarche ; but the marriage system of early
modern western Europe was highly flexible . Age at marriage and proportions
never marrying varied substantially both between populations and in the sane
population over time .(3)
The fall in general fertility in France after 1750 is not in doubt . Recons-
titution studies have shown that marital fertility had also begun to fall
from the last decade of the eighteenth century or even earlier in many
parishes . In sonic cases the fall was under way before the nineteenth century
began .(4) From 1831 onwards van de Walle's work has provided both national
and departmental estimates of marital fertility.(5) His national series
starts too late to capture the beginnings of the fall but it documents its
subsequent behavior and shows that thereafter the fall in marital fertility
dominates fertility trends and was so substantial as to drive general fer-
tility downwards in spite of the rise in nuptiality taking place at the sane
time. Since van de Walle's study formed a part of the Princeton European
fertility project, he expressed his findings in the demographic measures
devised by Coale to ensure comparability between the data relating to dif-
ferent countries . In table 4 the Princeton measure of marital fertility, Ig
is used to show the extent of the difference between France and other West
European countries in the course of the nineteenth century . In the late
eighteenth century Ig was about 0 .75, or 75 percent of that observed among
the Hutterites (an Ig equal to r .00 represents the Hutterite level : this
standard was chosen for the Princeton fertility measures as representing the
maximum known for any population) . It was distinctly higher than that found
in England before the transition (about 0 .67).
The level of marital fertility before the onset of family limitation, there-
fore, did not set France apart from other west European countries, but,
whereas elsewhere marital fertility showed no tendency to fall until about
188o, in France it fell very sharply in the early decades of the nineteenth
century . By 184o it had already fallen to two-thirds of its level before
1800 and by 1900 was only about half as high as it had been a century
earlier . The very much slower rate of population growth occurring in France
is principally due to the differences in marital fertility history .
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Table 4 : Marital fertility in France, England, Sweden and Germany
France England
and Wales Sweden Germany
1740-69 0 .775 1851 0 .675 1801-10 0 .688 1866-8 0 .761
1770-89 0 .742 1861 0 .670 1811-20 0 .705 1869-73 0 .760
1790-1819 0 .658 1871 0 .686 1821-30 0 .721 1874-77 0 .791
1831 0 .537 1881 0 .674 1831-40 0 .695 1878-82 0 .735
1836 0 .518 1891 0 .621 1841-50 0 .708 1883-7 0 .726
1841 0 .515 1901 0 .553 1851-60 0 .733 1888-92 0 .706
1846 0 .498 1911 0 .467 1861-70 0 .726 1898-1902 0 .664
1851 0 .478 1921 0 .375 1871-80 0 .751 1908-12 0 .542
1856 0 .478 1931 0 .292 1881-90 0 .716 1923-7 0 .334
1861 0 .478 1891-1900 0 .695 1931-5 0 .264
1866 0 .481 1901-10 0 .649
1871 0 .494 1911-20 0 .535
1876 0 .471 1921-30 0 .406
1881 0 .460 1931-40 0 .306
1886 0 .435
1891 0 .410 -
1896 0 .396
1901 0 .383
1911 0 .315
1921 0 .321
1931 0 .273
Sources : France 1740-1819 ; L. Henry, 'La fécondité des mariages dans le
quart soud-ouest de la France, de 1720 à 1829 (suite)', Annales, E .S.C ., 27
(1972), table 1, p . 979; L. Henry and J . Houdaille, 'Fécondité des ma-
riages dans le quart-nord-ouest de la France de 167o à 1829, Population 28
(1973), table 9 bis, p . 889 ; J . Houdaille, 'La fécondité des mariages de
1670 à 1829 dans le quart nord-est de la France', Annales de démographie
historique 1976, table 9, p
. 353 ; L . Henry, 'Fécondité des mariages dans
le quart sud-est de la France de 167o à 1829', Population, 33 (1978),
table 8, p. 866.
France 1831 to 1901 ; E . van de Walle, The female population of France in the
nineteenth century (Princeton, 1974), table 5 .5, p . 127 . France 1911 to
1931 : data supplied by A .J . Coale to whom I should like to record my
grateful acknowledgment.
Sweden : Hofsten and Lundström, Swedish population history, table 2.3,
p . 30.
Germany ; J .E . Knodel, The decline of fertility in Germany, 18 7 1 - 1 939
(Princeton 1974), appendix table 2.1, p. 272.
Figure 2, however, shows why it is difficult to treat France as conforming
to the normal model of the fertility transition described by Knodel and van
de Walle. The lack of conformity lies in the interruption to a smooth
decline in marital fertility which takes place in the middle decades of the
century . The fall in marital fertility decelerates sharply after 183o and is
even replaced by a slight rise between 185o and 187o. After 187o the fall
was resumed and continued until the 1930s, though by then the precipitous
fall in fertility elsewhere in western Europe meant that France was no
longer significantly different from her neighbors
. The view that France
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differed from other countries only in starting earlier and taking longer to
pass through the fertility transition is therefore difficult to sustain . The
problem does not lie in the length of time taken but in the cessation of
fall in Ig at a point when experience elsewhere suggests that it should have
been falling most rapidly.
France appears to be an exception to the rule suggested by Knodel and van de
Walle that "increases in the practice of family limitation and the decline
in marital fertility were largely coincident and, once under way, were
largely irreversible and gained momentum ."(6) In France after a long period
of steady and rapid fall, and at just the period when experience in other
countries suggests that the fall should have been at its most pronounced, it
slowed down sharply, and there was even a recovery lasting for about a
generation before the fall was resumed after 187o . This is the phenomenon
which van de Walle christened the "ski-jump" effect .(7) Was it simply an
aberration, or is it to be regarded as symptomatic of a situation which
should cause France before 1870 to be regarded not as an early entrant into
a process later to be found throughout Europe, but rather as experiencing a
development sui generis?
The pattern in France as a whole
The classic regulatory mechanism among west European populations of the early
modern period was marriage.(8) Substantial differences in nuptiality existed
and whether such differences are found in studies relating to several com-
munities at the same period, or in studies of the same place over a long
period of time, the relative levels of nuptiality found often lend them-
selves to a homeostatic interpretation of the function of marriage in the
general demography of the communities under study .(9) Where mortality was
unusually high or marital fertility unusually low, nuptiality tended to be
high, and vice-versa, resulting in intrinsic growth rates close to zero (or
at a level in close adjustment to local economic circumstances) . In view of
this it is intriguing to note that nuptiality declined substantially in
France during the eighteenth century as may be seen in figure 3.
Both age at first marriage and the proportion never marrying rose throughout
the eighteenth century. The effect of the changes in female nuptiality on
fertility was substantial . If we assume constant age-specific marital ferti-
lity at the level obtaining in France among the marriage cohort of 1740-69,
a woman marrying at the mean age of first marriage prevailing about 168o,
24.5 years, would have borne 6.48 children by age 5o assuming the marriage
was not prematurely ended by the death of one of the spouses . The rise in
marriage age that had occurred by about 1780, to 26,5 years, would have cut
this total to 5 .63 children . This is already a significant fall but it was
compounded by a rise in the proportion of women never marrying . Allowing for
the fact that 5 percent of all women never married in the earlier period but
as many as about 13 percent by the later date, the two figures fall to 6 .15
and 4.89 children respectively .(10) Nuptiality changes in the eighteenth
century therefore had the effect of reducing fertility by 20 per cent,
ceteris paribus.
The reduction in fertility brought about by nuptiality changes in eighteenth-
century France was substantial and would have sufficed to offset a consider-
able improvement in mortality without provoking an increase in the popula-
tion growth rate . For example, assuming that female expectation of life at
birth had been 24 years in the late seventeenth century, it would have
offset an improvement of about 6 years in expectation of life
.
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In the later eighteenth century, however, there were both some indications
of "strain" associated with the new nuptiality patterns and other develop-
ments in train which suggested the need for additional restrains on fertili-
ty if a rapid acceleration in the rate of population growth were not to
occur.
As nuptiality declined the illegitimacy ratio rose and the proportion of
brides who were pregnant increased . The changes were comparatively slight
until the middle of the eighteenth century but then accelerated sharply . It
is notable also that the proportion of older brides who were pregnant was
higher than among younger brides in France whereas the reverse was true of
England (table 6). The trends in illegitimacy and prenuptial pregnancy in
Table 5 : Prenuptial pregnancy in France and England (children born/baptised
within 0-7 elapsed months after marriage : rate per 1,000)
France
Age at marriage
All
England
Age at marriage
AllUnder 25 25 and over Under 25 25 and over
1690-1719 44 74 62 1650-1699 82 114 95
1720-1739 52 75 64 1700-1749 212 148 178
1740-1769 70 78 72 1750-1799 303 250 283
1770-1789 93 123 107 1800-1849 342 244 314
1790-1819 116 136 124
Sources : France ; Henry, 'La fécondité . . . dans le quart sud-ouest', p.
998 . Henry and Houdaille, 'Fécondité . . . dans le quart nord-ouest', p.
918 . Houdaille, 'La fécondité . . . dans le quart nord-est', p. 385 . Henry,
'Fécondité . . . dans le quart sud-est', p . 88r.
England ; Cambridge Group reconstitutions.
France suggest that a rising marriage age and more widespread celibacy made
extra-marital liaisons increasingly hard to resist, and the rise in prenup-
tial pregnancy with age of bride suggests women in their later twenties felt
the tension more acutely than younger women .(11) It is especially signifi-
cant in this connection that van de Walle and Lesthaeghe found that women
appeared to enter marriage more freely following the inception of the con-
trol of fertility within marriage . They were handicapped in their analysis
by their inability to calculate the standard Princeton measures for any
period earlier than 1831, by which date the fall in fertility had been under
way for a generation or more in many departments, but they concluded : "As
early as 1831, the control of fertility made possible the abandonment of the
restrictive nuptiality of the ancien regime ."(12) A rise in nuptiality
following close on the heels of the beginning of fertility control within
marriage suggests an unsatisfied demand for higher nuptiality which found
expression in rising illegitimacy and prenuptial pregnancy before the con-
trol of fertility in marriage, but thereafter in earlier and more universal
marriage for women.
Because of the countervailing movements in illegitimacy and prenuptial
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pregnancy the institution of marriage in eighteenth century France was less
well attuned than its equivalent in seventeenth-century England to securing
a substantial lowering in overall fertility . But if marriage may have been a
less effective means of influencing growth rates in France than in England,
it is also true that France faced an exceptionally severe test towards the
end of the eighteenth century in the form of an improvement in mortality on
a scale probably without parallel in earlier French history or in the con-
temporary experience of other European states . Between the 1780s and the
1820s, as we have seen, expectation of life rose from 28 to 39 years, an
enormous improvement . This was a very large absolute gain, but it is more to
the point to note that it was a huge proportional rise . As may be seen in
figure 1, the effect of any given absolute gain in expectation of life at
birth on the intrinsic growth rate decreases as expectation of life itself
rises : it is proportional rather than absolute gain which determines the
magnitude of its impact
. The proportional gain in
	
between the 1780s and
1820s was a great as the subsequent gain over the next hundred years (about
40 percent)
. The change taking place in France over the 40 years from the
1780s to the 1820s would have raised the intrinsic growth rate by fully 1 .o
percent per annum if fertility had not altered.
Although a change in mortality on this scale would have had a momentous
impact on growth rates with unchanged fertility, it is not immediately
obvious why it should have constituted a "problem" . Had the fertility level
in the 1820s remained at its 1780s height the intrinsic growth rate in
France would still have been well below the English level and about equal to
that found in Sweden (figure 1) . Possible answers to this question are at
present little more than speculation . Two may warrant further consideration.
First, it may prove important to distinguish between changes in the growth
rate brought about by changes within the socio-economic circumstances of
society and those engendered by exogenous forcés . An example of the former
might be a rise or fall in the intrinsic growth rate brought about by
nuptiality changes which might themselves be regarded as reflecting economic
changes .(13) They are evidence of the ability of demographic characteristics
to keep in step with economic change rather than a reason for further
demographic change
. But an exogenously-determined change, such as that
brought about by a change in the type of infectious diseases prevalent in a
.community, or in their virulence, is another matter
. In this case an offset
ting change in some other element in the community's demography may be
needed to preserve an unchanging relationship between a population and its
economic environment.
A second consideration which may also have a point in relation to the effect
on nuptiality and fertility of the improvement in mortality in France lies
in the possible differences between a peasant economy and one in which most
workers are wage-paid
. In the former the number of "niches" may be either
static or capable only of very slow expansion, whereas in the latter there
may be greater flexibility . Conceivably, therefore, a sharp fall in mortali-
ty in a peasant country like France may engender pressures to reduce ferti-
lity commensurately which may have no parallel in a country like England in
the early decades of the industrial revolution .(14)
The question of whether the early adoption of family limitation in France
took place in areas experiencing exceptionally large or unusually early
falls in mortality would repay further investigation . At a slightly later
period the data published by van de Walle are consonant with such a pattern
but his series begin too late to be more than suggestive in this regard.
It will be clear from the foregoing that I envisage the growing adoption of
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family limitation in France about 1800 as a variant form of the classic
prudential system of maintaining an equilibrium between population and
resources to which Malthus drew attention . Marriage was the lynchpin of the
Malthusian preventive check system . The level of fertility was altered
through marriage rather than within marriage . Where successful this system
made it possible to avoid population growth on a scale that would bring the
positive check into operation with mortality rising as misery deepened . That
nuptiality could operate very effectively in this role seems evident from
the example of England, but the same object could, of course, be realized by
controlling fertility directly and within marriage. This alternative was
already practised by small populations, both elite and peasant, before the
end of the eighteenth century but was first widely visible in France .(i5)
The data already presented in figure i show that the net reproduction rate
in France from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth century was always
close to i .00 . The NR Rs for the period 1740-1800 are set out in table 6.
They vary only between a minimum of 0.95 and maximum of i .o8, averaging
1 .04, equivalent to an intrinsic growth rate of only just over 1 per 1,000
per annum.
Table 6 : French net reproduction rates
NRR NRR
1740-1749 0 .97 1810-1819 1 .06
1750-1759 1 .07 1820-1829 1 .08
1760-1769 1 .06 1830-1839 1 .07
1770-1779 1 .03 1840-1849 1 .06
1780-1789 0 .95 1850-1859 1 .02
1790-1799 1 .03 1860-1869 1 .04
1800-1809 1 .04 1870-1879 1 .03
Sources : Gross reproduction rates from table 3 . Female life tables ; see
source notes to table 2.
The tendency of changes in French nuptiality, fertility and mortality to
interact in such a way as to keep the NRR very close to unity (and hence the
intrinsic growth rate close to zero) is of especial interest given the
history of mortality in France as the nineteenth century developed . After
the exceptionally rapid improvement in mortality which took place between
the 1780s and the 1820s, further progress for the next 6o years was much
more gradual (table 2) . Expectation of life at birth advanced by an average
of 2 .75 years per decade between the 1780s and the 1820s but by only 0 .75
years per decade between the 1820s and the 1880s, and since the NRR is
affected by proportional rather than absolute changes, the contrast between
the two periods is even more striking so far as the impact of mortality
change on growth rates is concerned . The net reproduction rate is the pro-
duct of the GRR and the proportion of women reaching the mean age at mater-
nity, p(m). Assuming a mean age at maternity of 31 years and using the
female life tables listed in the source notes to table 2, p(m) rose by 36
percent between the 1780s and the 1820s but by only a further 13 percent in
the next 6o years.
To preserve a net reproduction rate of i .00, therefore, the fall in marital
fertility needed to decelerate in the middle decades of the nineteenth
century since the improvement in mortality had slowed down, ceteris paribus.
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But nuptiality, the third factor affecting measures such as the NRR or the
intrinsic growth rate, was rising during this period . This necessarily
increased the scope for further falls in marital fertility to preserve an
unchanging NRR. The nuptiality changes shown in figure 3 would have in-
creased fertility by about 13 percent between the 1820s and the 1870s, but
even when this effect is added to that deriving from the improvement in
mortality, it still implies that an unchanging NRR close to unity could be
maintained only by a slackening in the rate of fall in marital fertili-
ty .(16) An alteration of this kind is very clear in figure 2 . I
	
fell by
about 25 percent between the 1780s and 1831, but only by g a further 15
percent in the following half century, and for part of this period was
rising slightly.
The behavior of marital fertility down to the 1870s, therefore, is consis-
tent with the view that it was a part of a system of the social regulation
of overall fertility, differing only from the "classic" European pattern in
that it operated not only through the timing and incidence of marriage but
also through the level of fertility within marriage . As long as the impro-
vement in mortality was comparatively slow and hesitant it was broadly
matched by nuptiality changes . This seems to have held true until the 1780s.
Thereafter for about 40 years there was a precipitate fall in mortality.
Nuptiality fell still further in the early part of this second period, but
with the increasingly widespread adoption of fertility control within mar-
riage, the fall in nuptiality flattened out and was reversed . After 1820
mortality rates fell much less swiftly for the next half century . In this
third period nuptiality continued to rise moderately, and marital fertility
moved downwards fast enough to offset the mortality and nuptiality changes,
but less quickly than in the second period . Indeed for part of the third
period marital fertility was rising . Throughout all three periods, from the
early eighteenth century to 187o, the intrinsic growth was always close to
zero.
Social regulation and individual control
In describing and commenting upon the change from control of fertility by
marriage in the pre-1780 period to the control of fertility within marriage
thereafter, I have drawn attention to the remarkable absence of change in
the intrinsic growth rate in spite of the striking changes in mortality,
marital fertility and nuptiality which occurred in France, but have largely
ignored all but the demographic mechanics of the change . The notion of
population homeostatis by the social regulation of marriage is a comparative-
ly well-explored topic .(17) But is it plausible to suppose that the notion
is also applicable to a situation in which a similar result arises through
fertility control within marriage? When individual couples begin to assume
responsibility for the number of their offspring, what might lead them to
act in such a way as to produce a similar result to that arising "automati-
cally" from, say, the link between the stock of marriages and the total of
suitable economic niches?
It is clearly premature to attempt to answer such questions fully . Their
nature and relevance is only just becoming clear with the accumulation of
evidence about the regularity and precision with which French regional
population under widely varying demographic regimes succeeded in maintaining
intrinsic growth rates so close to zero over long periods of time apparently
irrespective of the extent and speed of their adoption of fertility control
within marriage . Yet some discussion seems in order, if only to clarify the
nature of the issues involved .
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First, it would not be perverse to argue that the prime question is how
rather than whether
. The timing of the onset of fertility control within
marriage and the pace of its subsequent spread varied so greatly in dif-
ferent parts of France, and yet the intrinsic growth rate varied so little
before the last decades of the nineteenth century, that it is difficult to
resist the view that changes in nuptiality and marital fertility must have
been sensitive, so to speak, to each other's trends, and jointly sensitive
to mortality change.(18) It is stretching credulity very far to suppose that
individual control of fertility within marriage was not capable of acting
homeostatically in the sane way as nuptiality appears to have done.
The difficulty in accepting this supposition lies in identifying an element
in the decision-making of married couples which might produce the sane
result as that which may flow from the constraints on entering into marriage
in the first place. Either demographic feedback mechanisms, such as that
linking a marriage in the current generation of young people to the death of
a niche-holder in the previous generation, or similar relationships involving
economic variables also, as where the timing and extent of marriage is
conditioned by real wage trends, might serve to produce homeostasis where
marriage is the key .(19) But if marriage itself ceases to play this regula-
tory role, why should the decisions of individual couples in "spacing" or
"stopping" the haphazard flow of children give rise to a similar result?
Control of fertility by marriage may perhaps betray "unconscious rationali-
ty", but why should control of fertility within marriage do the same?(20)
Clearly the effect will be visible only in a large number of couples rather
than in each separate case . Family size variance declines with family limi-
tation but it does not disappear . Methods of contraception were not infal -
lible, and infant and child mortality levels remained sufficiently high to
make "targets" for individual couples hard to hit, or even to define . Equal-
ly, conscious and effective planning of family size was not unknown well
before its widespread appearance in nineteenth-century France . The Genevan
bourgeoisie make an especially clear-cut example of this point . When rising
marriage age, sharply increasing female celibacy, and high rates of emigra-
tion among young men during the seventeenth century failed to resolve the
tensions produced by over-rapid population growth within this select group,
they rapidly adopted methods of birth control which resulted in small fami-
lies and an end of child-bearing at a low average age .(21) Suggestive sta-
tistical evidence of family limitation has cone to light in a number of
other studies of small communities(22), and there is no lack of anthropolo-
gical evidence of the apparently universal interest in marital fertility and
of a wish to control it (both in an upwards and downwards direction),
sometimes coupled with the employment of practices likely to be effective in
restricting the number of births.(23)
Until more is known about the characteristics of pre-187o marital fertility
behavior in France, it is perhaps unprofitable to spend a great deal of time
in speculating about the circumstances which may have triggered the falls
that took place . But on the general issue, the following points might be
made . First, a major fall in infant and child mortality both increases the
total of surviving children and reduces the average interval between them,
ceteris paribus . The former may result in a stronger incentive to call a
halt to the continued flow of births within a family, for example from
concern about the subdivision of the partrimony
. The latter may enhance the
attractiveness of action to lengthen the interval between births if the
increased " density" of surviving children too young to earn their own keep
had a major impact on the living standards of the family
. Any tendency
towards " stopping" behavior will also be especially responsive to a move
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towards an earlier age at marriage for women.
Second, the relevant unit of analysis may remain a local community and
economy rather than the individual family after as well as before a switch
from control by marriage to control within marriage . The variance of family
size under conditions of natural fertility is so large that a high propor-
tion of families will have "surplus" offspring or be in deficit in relation
to their particular, individual needs
.(24) The movement of young people
between families overcomes this difficulty without inducing overall pressure
when the rate of growth of the local population and the local economy are in
harmony
. There is, so to speak, a very high rate of immigration and emigra-
tion between individual family enterprises, and this may be supplemented by
migration between the local community and the larger world. Where the brake
upon excessive population growth depends principally upon the timing and
incidence of marriage, any pressure may be mediated in part through direct
economic problems, such as finding a vacant holding or workshop, or saving
sufficient out of current incomes to enter the "market" for niche suitable
for a married couple . But in part it is also likely to be mediated indi-
rectly through community norms about the conventional age at which to begin
courtship, or about the family circumstances that justify such an initia-
tive. Similarly, with the advent of a statistically visible level and type
of family limitation, some individual couples may be directly conscious of a
need to restrict the number of their children or to optimise their spacing
in relation to perceived economic problems or opportunities, but others may
be carried along by changed behavioral norms which may cause them to wish to
avoid being conspicuously different from friends and neighbors in the number
of spacing of their offspring, or in the age at which childbearing ceases.
If there has long been homeostasis in the circle of relationships between
economic opportunity and demographic behavior, and if a change in some
aspect of demographic behavior supervenes, as when fertility within marriage
is manipulated in new ways, it is perhaps rather to be expected that homeos-
tatis will continue to be preserved by accomodating adjustments within the
system than that the system as a whole should immediately fall into disre-
pair . Only after a further three-quarters of a century had elapsed did a
fundamentally different set of relationships emerge in the last decades of
the nineteenth century, but by then the French economy was greatly changed
from its state in the revolutionary period.
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